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RESPONSE

Two Worlds, Neither Perfect: A Comment on
the Tension Between Legal and Empirical
Studies
TIMOTHY M. HAGLE†
The initial study1 and response2 by Professors Lee
Epstein, Christopher M. Parker, and Jeffrey A. Segal along
with the critique3 by Professor Todd E. Pettys provide a good
example of the tension between traditional legal studies and
empirical studies that are common in the behavioral social
sciences.4 Broadly speaking, empirical studies tend to reject

† Associate Professor of Political Science, the University of Iowa. Professor Hagle
also has a law degree from Thomas M. Cooley Law School.
1. Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker, & Jeffrey A. Segal, Do Justices
Defend the Speech They Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the First
Amendment, available at http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroupBias.pdf (last
visited Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Epstein et al., In-Group Bias]. The authors
presented the study at the 2013 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association.
2. Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker, & Jeffrey A. Segal, A Response to a
Critique of Our Study on In-Group Bias (Sept. 30, 2014), available at
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroupBiasResponse.pdf [hereinafter Epstein
et al., Response].
3. Todd E. Pettys, Free Expression, In-Group Bias, and the Court’s
Conservatives: A Critique of the Epstein-Parker-Segal Study, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 1
(2015).
4. The term empirical can take on slightly different meanings depending on
the context. It might generally mean a rejection of theory for experience. The
notion of an empirical legal study might very well reject traditional legal theories,
but is likely to replace them with theories common to the behavioral sciences,
such as rational actor theory or the ideologically driven decision-maker. It is
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traditional legal factors such as precedent and legal
reasoning as a basis for explaining case outcomes and judicial
behavior. At the extreme, some behavioral social scientists
would reject precedent and legal reasoning all together,
characterizing them as little more than a “veneer of
objectivity.”5 A second difference between the two types of
studies is the reliance on the power of large datasets and
statistical analysis in many empirical studies. Judges may
very well tell us, for example, that they only decide cases
based on the law and precedent, but it is hard to argue
against a study involving hundreds or thousands of cases
that shows a statistically significant basis for believing
otherwise.
Although I could write at some length regarding concerns
I have with either the study or the critique, given the need to
keep this Response short I will focus on only two points: use
of the Supreme Court Database6 and coding the variables.
I am very familiar with the Supreme Court Database as
I have used it extensively for many years. It is an immensely
valuable resource for those doing research on the Supreme
Court. It does, however, have its limitations.7 For the most
part, those limitations only become a problem when
researchers do not recognize the database’s limitations, use
the database for purposes beyond its capabilities, or when
those interpreting a study’s results do not understand the
underlying limitations. One such limitation is that the vast
majority of cases only have a single entry in the database. A
single entry per case results in most of the variables only
being given a single code. This is appropriate for simple
variables such as the docket number or the immediate lower
court.8 Such single codes can, however, be a problem when
usually the differing theoretical bases that tends to cause the tension between
adherents of the two approaches.
5. HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY MAKING: EXPLANATION
PREDICTION 63-64 (1979).

AND

6. SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/index.php (last visited
Feb. 2, 2015).
7. See, e.g., Pettys, supra note 3, at 74-75 nn.375-80 and accompanying text.
8. See Online Code Book, SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/
documentation.php?s=1 (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
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there are multiple parties involved in the litigation, as Pettys
points out.9 The codes for the litigants in a case will nearly
always be based on the named party, regardless of other
parties that join the litigation, not to mention those who file
as amici. This is important in a study such as that of Epstein
et al., where the litigants are to be characterized as either
liberal or conservative.10 This can create a problem in
instances where parties on one side or the other of the
litigation may appropriately be characterized as both liberal
and conservative.11
Along similar lines, the vast majority of cases in the
database only have a single entry for the issue or legal
provision being considered by the Supreme Court. Reasons
for a case to have multiple entries include more than one
issue being coded for a case, more than one legal provision
being considered by the Court, or a split vote among the
justices on a single issue.12 Regardless of how many entries a
case has, or how many parties join the case, at some level we
must rely on the judgment of the researchers to make the
appropriate coding decisions. That leads us to the second
point.
Pettys spends a great deal of his critique pointing out
what he sees as problems in the basic coding of the cases by
Epstein et al.13 In essence, part of his criticism has to do with
the multidimensionality of some of the cases. 14 Another
aspect of Pettys’s critique has to do with forcing what might
be an indeterminate vote or outcome into a binary
liberal/conservative coding structure.15
9. Pettys supra note 3, at 27 n.130 and accompanying text.
10. Epstein et al., In-Group Bias, supra note 1, Figure 1 & Table 1.
11. Pettys, supra note 3, at 27 nn.130-31 and accompanying text.
12. See Current Dataset: 2014 Release 01, SUPREME COURT DATABASE,
http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). The current online
version of the database offers four different versions of case centered data based
on either Supreme Court citation, docket number, multiple issues or legal
provisions, or split votes.
13. See Pettys, supra note 3, Part II.
14. See id. Part II.A.
15. See id. Part II.B.
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More generally, the problem is that characterizing
litigants or votes as liberal or conservative requires a
subjective judgment. It is true, of course, that many litigants
and votes can clearly be labeled as liberal or conservative. 16
There are, however, times when the appropriate label is not
so clear.17 This is particularly so when, as in the Epstein et
al. study, one is essentially attempting to code what a justice
perceives the ideological orientation of the litigants to be.18
Explicit coding rules can help, but even these can be subject
to interpretation. Incorporating such interpretations into the
coding can detract from the objective value of the empirical
study, perhaps even introducing bias on the part of the
coders.19
Researchers can take steps to avoid overly subjective
coding or bias on the part of the coders, but this does not
guarantee that all such problems are eliminated. At the very
least, we may still be left with differences of opinion as to
whether the coding rules are appropriate or whether they
have been correctly followed in particular instances. Epstein
et al. made a few corrections based on the challenges by
Pettys,20 but they dismiss most of Pettys’s challenges as
“coding disagreements.”21
Perhaps without realizing it, Epstein et al. have put their
finger on the precise problem. What constitutes a coding
disagreement that can be easily dismissed as opposed to
something more serious? To the extent such disagreements
exist, whose view should we accept: that of the original
16. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
For First Amendment issues, if a justice supports the person or entity claiming a
First Amendment right, that vote is coded liberal. If the justice supports the
restriction or limitation imposed by the government, the vote is considered
conservative. Thus, in Tinker the votes of the seven justices who voted in favor of
the students’ speech rights are coded liberal and those of dissenting Justices
Black and Harlan are coded conservative.
17. See, e.g., Pettys, supra note 3, Part II.B–D.
18. See, e.g., id. Part IV.
19. See id. at 70 n.367 and accompanying text (Pettys speaks of this in terms
of confirmation bias.).
20. See Epstein et al., Response, supra note 2, at 1; see also Pettys, supra note
3, at 80 n.404 and accompanying text.
21. Epstein et al., Response, supra note 2, at 1.
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researcher or the critic? I am not sure that all such
disagreements can be eliminated regardless of how careful
the researcher is or how clear the coding rules are.
Nevertheless, it is always important to be aware of
measurement limitations and to not oversell the results.
Of course, researchers cannot be held responsible for the
interpretations placed on their research, particularly by
those outside the academic community who may not be well
versed in interpreting results of such studies. It is also true
that not all social science studies are done with the rigor that
would allow them to be considered reliable efforts.
Nevertheless, even the best researchers must guard against
bias in their own procedures and analysis.
Unfortunately, few empirical studies get an examination
as thorough as the Epstein et al. study did by Pettys. Even
when a study makes its dataset available for examination,
few reviewers or others interested in the results would be
inclined to dig deeply into it. In most instances, this might
not matter if the study receives minimal attention. On the
other hand, when the study gets an unusual amount of
attention, particularly beyond the usual academic audience, 22
it may be worthwhile to take a closer look at it. Along these
lines I am reminded of the use of DNA testing as evidence in
trials. Once the scientific basis for DNA testing was
established and accepted by courts it became very hard to
argue against the statistical power of such tests.
Nevertheless, one can still question the procedures used by
those gathering DNA evidence or by the labs processing the
samples. The power of large datasets and statistical analysis
to uncover patterns in case outcomes and judicial behavior
cannot be denied, but the procedures used to construct those
datasets can—and should—be examined to ensure a proper
level of rigor. This is not a criticism of Epstein et al., but
rather a recognition that regardless of how accomplished a
researcher is, it is still worthwhile to closely examine the
data and methods of the research.
Returning to the tension between empirical studies and
traditional legal studies, empiricists might complain that
22. See, e.g., Pettys, supra note 3, at 70 n.366 and accompanying text (where
Pettys notes how the results of the Epstein et al. study received attention from a
national media outlet).
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traditional legal scholars cannot see the forest for the trees,
meaning that too much attention to individual cases or votes
can blind one to considerations that emerge on a larger scale.
Although I believe this to be true, in at least a partial defense
of traditional legal studies, I would say that to understand
the forest, one also needs a solid working knowledge of the
trees.

